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Partition and Revelation
Yun-chien Chang' & Lee Anne Fennelltt
INTRODUCTION
Although property ownership is prototypically associated
with a single owner, land is very often co-owned. When things go
wrong among co-owners, the law has a built-in escape hatch:
partition. Co-tenants' can partition the co-owned properties
through voluntary agreement, or any co-tenant may petition a
court for partitioning.2 All jurisdictions we know require una-
nimity for the former but design the latter petition right to be
unilateral. 3 Partition may be either in kind (the land is physical-
ly divided up), by sale, or through some combination of these
methods. 4 Regardless of the method chosen, the judicial par-
tition process operates coercively as to at least some of the
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involved.
2 Some jurisdictions place limits on the judicial partition right, such as a require-
ment that voluntary partition first be sought by the parties. See Yun-chien Chang and
Lee Anne Fennell, Appendices to Partition and Revelation, 81 U Chi L Rev Dialogue 1,
1-4 (2014), online at https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/page/chang-fennell (Appendix A).
3 See id.
4 See Jesse Dukeminier, et al, Property 345-46 (Aspen 7th ed 2010) (examining
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co-tenants. It thus implicates problems of value revelation akin
to those raised by other coercive land transfers, such as eminent
domain. Indeed, despite receiving relatively little scholarly at-
tention, revelation in the co-ownership context raises a set of
questions that are in some ways richer and more interesting
than those presented by government condemnation.
Existing economic analyses of partition have primarily ex-
amined whether partition by sale or partition in kind is more ef-
ficient, with a strong emphasis on balancing economies of scale
against subjective attachments to the land.5 In this Article, we
focus on two aspects of the problem that have been neglected in
earlier treatments. First, we consider the implications of differ-
ent judicial partition procedures on the bargaining dynamics
that precede resorting to judicial partition.6 Second, we consider
the potential impacts on efficiency of intermediate and partial
forms of partition, which are prevalent in practice. Considered
together, these two branches of our analysis show how more ac-
curate revelation mechanisms might play a role in advancing
the efficiency of co-ownership.
One interesting and counterintuitive result of our analysis
is that the goal of incentivizing efficient pre-partition behavior
may be in some tension with the goal of seeking efficiency in the
partition process itself. Perfect auction mechanisms that force
parties to reveal subjective valuations in the judicial partition
context could alter the negotiation dynamic in ways that make
voluntary partition less likely. As a result, better revelation
mechanisms may not always yield better outcomes. The chal-
lenge is to design partition approaches that allow subjective val-
ues to be taken into account in deciding how to partition proper-
ty without encouraging socially wasteful struggles over surplus
in earlier periods. A useful partition approach must also deal
5 See Part I.A. Scholars have also investigated the existence and magnitude of dis-
counts associated with different judicial sales procedures. See Chang and Fennell, 81 U
Chi L Rev Dialogue at 4-6 (cited in note 2) (Appendix B).
6 Our focus on ex ante effects parallels that in Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Property
Rights and Liability Rules: The Ex Ante View of the Cathedral, 100 Mich L Rev 601
(2001). We are not the first to note the potential influence of judicial partition rules on
bargaining dynamics. See, for example, Sarah E. Waldeck, Rethinking the Intersection of
Inheritance and the Law of Tenancy in Common, 87 Notre Dame L Rev 737, 753-54
(2011). One element that we do not examine is the role of court delays in generating bar-
gaining leverage for co-tenants independent of the substantive rule that will be (eventu-
ally) applied. See generally Manel Baucells and Steven A. Lippman, Justice Delayed Is
Justice Denied: A Cooperative Game Theoretic Analysis of Hold-up in Co-ownership, 22
Cardozo L Rev 1191 (2001).
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reasonably well with the liquidity and coordination shortfalls
that can hamper revelation of value in the co-ownership context.
Because partition design features that advance some effi-
ciency goals impede others, we cannot determine the best ap-
proach without additional research-both empirical studies and
formal theoretical modeling. We can say with some confidence
that no first-best partition solution is achievable under real-
world conditions. At the same time, we see significant room for
improvement over the status quo. Our goal in this Article is to
lay out the considerations relevant to the choice of a new parti-
tion mechanism.
This Article proceeds in two parts. Part I critically reviews
the prior literature on the relative efficiency of partition in kind
and partition by sale by focusing on two areas of neglect: the
bargaining problem faced by co-tenants under the shadow of dif-
ferent judicial partition rules, and the role of intermediate parti-
tion approaches in addressing liquidity and coordination short-
falls. Part II considers possible ways to improve partition rules
by attending to these concerns.
Our analysis here will be limited in three respects. First, we
will focus only on partition as it applies to possessory interests
in real property. Second, we will largely abstract away from doc-
trinal detail to generate a stylized account of the efficiency im-
plications of different approaches. s Third, although we will con-
sider the localized distributive effects of different partition rules
insofar as those effects influence pre-partition bargaining and
value revelation, our treatment will necessarily leave un-
addressed many important normative and empirical questions
surrounding the distributive effects of partition rules.9
I. BEYOND A BINARY Ex POST ANALYSIS
If the co-owners who wish to end their co-ownership rela-
tionship can arrive at a voluntary partition agreement, they will
7 For a modeling approach to a similar division problem, see generally Peter
Cramton, Robert Gibbons, and Paul Klemperer, Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently, 55
Econometrica 615 (1987).
8 Our analysis is nonetheless informed by our comparative findings, which are
compiled in Appendix A. See Chang and Fennell, 81 U Chi L Rev Dialogue at 1-4 (cited
in note 2). We will refer at times to the practices of particular jurisdictions.
9 See generally, for example, Phyliss Craig-Taylor, Through a Colored Looking
Glass: A View of Judicial Partition, Family Land Loss, and Rule Setting, 78 Wash U L Q
737 (2000); Thomas W. Mitchell, Stephen Malpezzi, and Richard K. Green, Forced Sale
Risk: Class, Race, and the "Double Discount," 37 Fla St U L Rev 589 (2010).
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not need to seek judicial partition. One of us, using data from
Taiwan, has shown that about 92.6 percent of the time, co-
tenants who sought to dissolve co-ownership were able to reach
an agreement to partition their co-owned interests. 10 Still, a
nonnegligible portion of co-tenants cannot agree and have to rely
on the court to provide a solution. Existing analyses of the judi-
cial solution have largely approached the question from an ex
post perspective, rather than considering the effects of the parti-
tion rule on pre-partition bargaining. The choice is also typically
analyzed as a binary one between partition in kind and partition
by sale, even though intermediate approaches can help to ad-
dress liquidity and coordination problems that can impede effi-
cient outcomes. We will start with a brief overview of the exist-
ing literature before turning to these two shortfalls.
A. Subjective Valuations and Economies of Scale
Modern jurisdictions exhibit variation as to whether parti-
tion in kind or partition by sale is preferred and as to the
strength of the presumption in favor of the preferred approach.11
Most American jurisdictions have a common law rule that pur-
ports to favor partition in kind, but scholars suggest that courts
usually order partition by sale.12 The fact that there are econo-
mies of scale associated with keeping the land intact is often the
rationale for departing from the stated preference for partition
in kind. The most commonly cited reason for sticking with the
traditional preference for partition in kind is the subjective value
that one or more of the co-tenants have in the land. 13 Similarly,
10 See Yun-chien Chang, Tenancy in "Anticommons"? A Theoretical and Empirical
Analysis of Co-ownership, 4 J Legal Analysis 515, 535 (2012).
11 For details, see Chang and Fennell, 81 U Chi L Rev Dialogue at 1-4 (cited in
note 2) (Appendix A).
12 See, for example, Dukeminier, et al, Property at 343-44 (cited in note 4); Mitch-
ell, Malpezzi, and Green, 37 Fla St U L Rev at 610 (cited in note 9); William B. Stoebuck
and Dale A. Whitman, The Law of Property 223 (West 3d ed 2000).
13 See, for example, Delfino v Vealencis, 436 A2d 27, 33 (Conn 1980):
[O]ne of the tenants in common has been in actual and exclusive possession of
a portion of the property for a substantial period of time; ... has made her
home on the property; . . . [and] derives her livelihood from the operation of a
business on this portion of the property, as her family before her has for many
years.
See also Ark Land Co v Harper, 599 SE2d 754, 761 (W Va 2004) (holding that the eco-
nomic value of the property alone is not dispositive and that "[e]vidence of longstanding
ownership, coupled with sentimental or emotional interests in the property, may also be
[81:27
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Article 258 of the Civil Code of Japan'l and Article 100 of Chi-
na's Property Law of 200715 stipulate that partition in kind, the
default, can be overridden if physical division is infeasible or
significantly value reducing. These prescriptions can be con-
strued as taking into account the economy of scale.
Subjective valuation and economies of scale also feature
prominently in existing economic analyses of the choice between
partition rules, including the one offered by Professors Thomas
Miceli and C.F. Sirmans.16 In essence, their argument is as fol-
lows: If partition in kind does not decrease economy of scale,
partition in kind is always efficient.17 If partition in kind does
decrease economy of scale, partition in kind is sometimes effi-
cient because it preserves subjective value, whereas partition by
sale is sometimes efficient because it prevents the fall of market
value due to fragmentation.18 To be more exact, "when the ag-
gregate subjective value of the nonconsenting owners" is larger
than the premium derived from economy of scale, partition in
kind should be used.19
Professors Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky disa-
gree with this analysis, favoring partition by sale across the
board.20 Their argument is that as long as co-owners participate
in the auction, co-owners with high subjective values can pre-
serve their subjective values by winning the bid.21 Participation
of co-owners with high subjective values in the auction does not
ensure efficient results, however, if more than one co-owner has
subjective value in the property. The key is that subjective value
considered in deciding whether the interests of the party opposing the sale will be preju-
diced by the property's sale").
14 Civil Code of Japan Art 258, as translated in Japanese Law Translation (Minis-
try of Justice Apr 1, 2009), online at http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail
/?id=2057&vm=02&re=02&new=1 (visited Mar 2, 2014).
15 Property Law of the People's Republic of China Art 100, as translated in Property Law
of the People's Republic of China, online at http://www.china.org.cn/china/LegislationsForm2001
-2010/2011-02/11/content_21897791.htm (visited Mar 2, 2014). Note: The official transla-
tion of this statute uses the term "severance" in place of "partition."
16 Thomas J. Miceli and C.F. Sirmans, Partition of Real Estate; or, Breaking Up Is
(Not) Hard to Do, 29 J Legal Stud 783 (2000).
17 Id at 789.
18 See id at 791-92.
19 Id at 793.
20 See Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 Cornell L
Rev 531, 601 (2005). See also Candace Reid, Note, Partitions in Kind: A Preference with-
out Favor, 7 Cardozo L Rev 855, 878 (1986). For arguments for partition in kind, see Eric
R. Claeys, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Gridlock, 53 Ariz L Rev 9, 36 (2011).
21 See Bell and Parchomovsky, 90 Cornell L Rev at 601 (cited in note 20).
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is idiosyncratic and nontransferable. Separate co-owners may be
unable to band together to bid their joint valuations. Perhaps
they are too numerous or contentious to coordinate easily, or
they hold idiosyncratic attachments to different but overlapping
subsets of the land.
Liquidity often presents another obstacle. In American ju-
risdictions, the winning bidder has to pay the auction price in
cash, and many co-tenants will not be able to do it.22 This prob-
lem could be mitigated. In Taiwan, where the winning bidder
generally has to pay the auction price within five to seven days
after the auction, banks provide a loan within seven days in re-
sponse to this requirement.23 Because the property's assessed
value determines the amount that a bank would be willing to
lend, however, speedy loans may be insufficient to enable finan-
cially constrained co-owners with idiosyncratically high subjec-
tive valuations to protect their interests in the property.
It is also worth noting that properties are often sold at a
price lower than fair market value (FMV).24 Such an auction dis-
count does not necessarily signal inefficiency. Most likely, the in-
itial purchaser will be a middleperson who then resells. If the
ultimate purchaser is the high valuer, the only question is
whether moving the property to her in two transactions rather
than one adds net costs. For the reasons suggested above, how-
ever, high-valuing co-tenants may fail to end up with the prop-
erty. These problems of liquidity and coordination explain why
partition in kind could sometimes be more efficient than parti-
tion by sale. But, as we will see, partial partition in kind may do
even better.25
22 See Michael Heller, The Gridlock Economy: How Too Much Ownership Wrecks
Markets, Stops Innovation, and Costs Lives 122 (Basic Books 2008). See also Reid, Note,
7 Cardozo L Rev at 872 (cited in note 20) (observing that if co-owners lack the financial
ability to bid in the auction, courts usually will not order partition by sale).
23 For an example of a bank that provides this loan, see http://www.ubot.com.tw
(visited Mar 2, 2014).
24 For a review of the theoretical and empirical work on the sale of properties at
auction, see Chang and Fennell, 81 U Chi L Rev Dialogue at 4-6 (cited in note 2) (Ap-
pendix B). Fair market value is "the amount that a willing buyer would pay a willing
seller of the property, taking into account all possible uses to which the property might
be put other than the use contemplated by the taker." David A. Dana and Thomas W.
Merrill, Property: Takings 169-70 (Foundation 2002). We use fair market value and
market value as synonyms.
25 See Part I.C.
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B. Partition's Shadow
The analysis above assumed that the efficiency of a parti-
tion rule can be evaluated based solely on the partition event it-
self.26 But partition rules carry implications for earlier decisions
as well.27 We will focus on the ex ante impact of judicial partition
rules on pre-partition bargaining, but it is worth noting that a
series of earlier decisions, including the decision to become a co-
owner or to make investments in developing subjective attach-
ments to the land, may also be influenced by the judicial parti-
tion rule.
Central to our analysis is an understanding of judicial parti-
tion as a private taking.28 One or more of the co-owners will be
coercively dispossessed of her undivided fractional share in the
property and given either land or money instead. Depending on
the applicable partition rules, a co-owner might use the judicial
process to "take" the property of her co-tenants for less than its
value.29 Because co-owners are also potential takees, they may
engage in costly stratagems to stave off the taking or to bring it
on, depending on the level of expected compensation. These con-
cerns, well-recognized in the eminent domain context, are
heightened in the partition context because the parties them-
selves have considerable control over whether the taking will oc-
cur and considerable insight into the compensation that will be
provided in the event the taking occurs.
We view voluntary partition agreements as more desirable
than judicial partition, other things equal, because they save on
court costs and make use of a consensual rather than coercive
26 Miceli and Sirmans, for example, preface their modeling of the judicial partition
choice with the assumption that voluntary partition is unavailable due to high transac-
tion costs. Miceli and Sirmans, 29 J Legal Stud at 788 (cited in note 16).
27 See Bebchuk, 100 Mich L Rev at 633-34 (cited in note 6) (making an analogous
point about the choice between liability rules and property rules).
28 See Abraham Bell, Private Takings, 76 U Chi L Rev 517, 565-66 (2009) (discuss-
ing overly fractionated shares in land as a situation potentially ripe for the use of a pri-
vate taking); Miceli and Sirmans, 29 J Legal Stud at 791 n 22 (cited in note 16).
29 See Bell, 76 U Chi L Rev at 566 (cited in note 28); Miceli and Sirmans, 29 J Legal
Stud at 791 & n 23 (cited in note 16). The point is stronger here than in the context of
eminent domain. When the government is the taker, it is not entirely clear whether and
how monetary payments influence incentives to take. See, for example, Daryl J. Levin-
son, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 Harv L Rev 915, 916, 969
(2005); Yun-chien Chang, Private Property and Takings Compensation: Theoretical
Framework and Empirical Analysis 14-46, 75-89, 138-39, 158-60 (Edward Elgar 2013).
For private parties, the relationship between monetary payoffs and incentives is far
more direct and uncontroversial.
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transfer process. 30 Thus, we count it as a point in favor of a judi-
cial partition method if it can control pre-partition strategizing
and encourage efficient voluntary partitions. Neither an across-
the-board rule of partition by sale nor a blanket rule of partition
in kind can reliably achieve this result. Either rule may offer
some co-tenants an attractive strategic opportunity to pursue
the less socially valuable type of partition in a given case. 31
Suppose there are two types of co-tenants, some with high
subjective values (HSV co-tenants) and some whose valuations
merely track the fair market value of the property (FMV co-
tenants). Many co-ownership situations will involve a mix of
these co-tenant types. Consider first a judicial rule of partition
by sale. HSV co-tenants will be fearful of the judicial partition
process if they lack the financial ability to be the high bidder in
a sale. Knowing this, FMV co-tenants may attempt to extract
side payments from the HSV co-tenants for not seeking judicial
partition. These efforts (and the efforts of the HSV co-tenants to
resist making such payments) will be socially costly, regardless
of the distributive result.
The bargaining situation is not necessarily improved if the
HSV co-tenants are able to bid in the partition sale. FMV co-
tenants may resist an efficient voluntary agreement to partition
the property in kind if they believe they will get a greater sur-
plus from a partition sale. This could occur if the partition sales
procedure will induce an HSV co-tenant to bid her true valua-
tion and will require her to disgorge equal shares of that win-
ning bid to her co-tenants. 32 This procedure will effectively
transfer some of the HSV co-tenant's subjective surplus in the
property to the FMV co-tenants, and it will do so at positive cost.
Interestingly, this problem becomes more severe the better the
30 A consensual process might have autonomy-based or distributive advantages, in
addition to any efficiency advantages it might have in harnessing information. One of us
has argued that property rules, which rely on a consensual process, are more efficient
than liability rules, which utilize a coercive process, because the former better harness
private information. See Yun-chien Chang, Optional Law in Property: Theoretical Cri-
tiques *28-29 (Nov 2013), online at http://ssrn.conabstract=2351651 (visited Mar 2,
2014). The extent and indeed existence of this advantage in the co-tenancy context is
open to debate and subject to empirical verification.
31 An extended example that explores these bargaining dynamics is provided in
Appendix C. See Chang and Fennell, 81 U Chi L Rev Dialogue at 6-12 (cited in note 2)
(Appendix C).
32 Whether an auction procedure would actually elicit true valuations or require
parties to disgorge a share of their subjective value depends on the design details of the
auction procedure. See Part II.A.
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judicial sales procedure does at eliciting honest revelations; a
blunter procedure would reduce the incentive of the FMV co-
tenants to strategically seek judicial partition.33
An inverse problem exists when bargaining in the shadow of
judicial partition in kind. Here, the HSV co-tenants could stand
on their rights and threaten to invoke the judicial partition pro-
cedure even when partition by sale would be much more effi-
cient, as where economies of scale are great. In such a case, the
HSV co-tenants might threaten to seek judicial partition in kind
unless they are paid off by the FMV co-tenants. Indeed, some
FMV co-tenants might masquerade as HSV co-tenants in an ef-
fort to glean more of the surplus that a sale of the property
would bring. These efforts would again be socially costly, even if
unsuccessful. Moreover, the HSV (or faux HSV) co-tenants could
proceed to invoke judicial partition in kind in order to gain own-
ership of fragments that could enable them to operate as hold-
outs in any later-attempted reassembly of the land.
If the parties were always certain that the efficient judicial
partition choice would be made by a court-whether partition in
kind or partition by sale-none of the co-tenants could threaten
the other with an inefficient procedure merely to extract sur-
plus. 34 But to make the efficient choice, the court needs to ascer-
tain whether the value derived from economy of scale is larger
than the subjective value lost through auctioning properties off.
While the extent of economy of scale can be assessed objectively
by, say, hedonic regression models, ,3 subjective value is notori-
ously unobservable by third parties, such as courts.36 Miceli and
33 This suggests a possible silver lining to the auction discount, at least if the HSV
co-tenants have the ability to participate in the auction. See text accompanying notes
24-25; Chang and Fennell, 80 U Chi L Rev Dialogue at 4-6 (cited in note 2) (Appendix
B).
34 The statement in the text sets aside the role of time delays in independently gen-
erating bargaining leverage. See generally Baucells and Lippman, 22 Cardozo L Rev
1191 (cited in note 6).
35 Hedonic regression models can be used to first estimate the market value of the
whole plot and then used to estimate the summation of market value of each postparti-
tion parcel. The difference in the two estimates is the value of scale economy. Hedonic
regression models have been used to estimate market value of real properties in, for ex-
ample, Yun-chien Chang, An Empirical Study of Court-Adjudicated Takings Compensa-
tion in New York City: 1990-2003, 8 J Empirical Legal Stud 384, 392-401 (2011); Yun-
chien Chang, An Empirical Study of Compensation Paid in Eminent Domain Settle-
ments: New York City, 1990-2002, 39 J Legal Stud 201, 214-21 (2010).
36 See Miceli and Sirmans, 29 J Legal Stud at 793 (cited in note 16); Yun-chien
Chang, Economic Value or Fair Market Value: What Form of Takings Compensation Is
Efficient?, 20 S Ct Econ Rev 35, 64 (2012).
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Sirmans's analysis suggests a rough proxy: that partition in
kind should be preferred when the land parcel is large and the
number of co-owners is small.37 But this proxy is insufficient to
ensure efficient results and may not successfully control strate-
gizing.38
In fact, courts typically leave open the possibility of either
partition procedure. On one view, this lack of clarity may im-
pede the voluntary partition bargaining process. Parties may be
too eager to go to court, each believing he or she can convince
the court that economies of scale outweigh subjective valuations,
or vice versa. On the other hand, the uncertainty of the judicial
partition outcome could reduce certain forms of strategizing and
improve bargaining.39 Ideally, a legal rule would accommodate
co-tenants' efficiency-enhancing reasons for requesting or resist-
ing a particular partition method (that it will preserve or de-
stroy subjective value, or that it will realize or undermine econ-
omies of scale) without encouraging costly efforts to wrest
surplus from other co-tenants.
In addition to raising questions about the optimal strength
and clarity of the default rules, this analysis raises empirical
questions about how likely the judicial partition rule is to influ-
ence the success rates of private bargaining.
C. Intermediate Partition Approaches
The existing economic literature on partition has primarily
focused on the choice between partition in kind and partition by
sale.4o But courts need not make a binary choice between these
partition methods. Indeed, even traditional partition in kind is
often accompanied by compensatory payments among the
parties, known as owelty. 41 A variety of other intermediate
37 See Miceli and Sirmans, 29 J Legal Stud at 793 (cited in note 16) (examining the
effect of lot size and number of parties on the efficiency of competing partition methods).
38 For example, some situations involving diseconomies of scale may also argue for
partition by sale. See Chang and Fennell, 81 U Chi L Rev Dialogue at 12-13 (cited in
note 2) (Appendix D).
39 See generally Ian Ayres and Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining. Dividing a Legal
Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 Yale L J 1027 (1995).
40 See, for example, Bell and Parchomovsky, 90 Cornell L Rev at 600 (cited in note
20).
41 Owelty may be used where the property is not amenable to division into equally
valuable segments, perhaps due to improvements. See, for example, Dukeminier, et al,
Property at 343-44, 358 (cited in note 4); John G. Casagrande Jr, Note, Acquiring Prop-
erty through Forced Partitioning Sales: Abuses and Remedies, 27 BC L Rev 755, 764
(1986).
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approaches exist in practice. For example, the Russian system
couples a strong presumption in favor of partition in kind with a
put option that lets any co-tenant be bought out upon her de-
mand.42 Some US jurisdictions offer an allotment system that
gives co-owners who desire continued possession the option to
buy out the co-owners who have petitioned for a partition sale.
41
A variation enables some co-owners to break off a portion of the
property for exclusive possession while the balance is divided or
sold.44 Court-ordered partial partition is also commonly used in
some jurisdictions: empirical studies in Taiwan, for example,
show that the court orders partial partition about 60 percent of
the time.45
In this Section, we consider the intermediate solution of
partial partition. To motivate the discussion, consider the follow-
ing example. A decedent leaves Homeacre to his two children,
Ann and Burt, and to a longtime family friend, Casper, in equal
undivided shares. Homeacre contains two structures: a family
home that sits on two-thirds of the lot, and a detached garage
apartment that sits on the remaining third, as shown in Figure 1.
42 The Civil Code of the Russian Federation provides:
If the partition of a participatory share in kind is not permitted by a law or is
impossible without incommensurate damage to property in common ownership,
the partitioning owner shall have the right to payment to him of the value of
his participatory share by the other participants of participatory share owner-
ship.
Civil Code of the Rus Federation Art 252(3), as translated in 2 Russia & the Republics
Legal Materials Part One at 123 (Juris 2013) (William E. Butler, ed and trans).
43 Zachary D. Kuperman, Note, Cutting the Baby in Half. An Economic Critique of
Indivisible Resource Partition, 77 Brooklyn L Rev 263, 290-95 (2011) (detailing this ap-
proach, which a substantial minority of US jurisdictions have adopted in some form).
The Uniform Partition of Heirs Property Act (UPHPA) drafted by the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 2010 also includes this approach. See
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Partition of Heirs
Property Act § 7, online at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/partition%20o/20heirs
%20property/uphpa-final_10.pdf (visited Mar 2, 2014). See also Kuperman, Note, 77
Brooklyn L Rev at 293 (cited in note 43).
44 See Casagrande, Note, 27 BC L Rev at 764 (cited in note 41).
45 See Chang, 4 J Legal Analysis at 535 (cited in note 10). Partition in kind and
partition by sale are each ordered about 20 percent of the time. Id. See also Uniform Par-
tition of Heirs Property Act § 8, comment 1 (cited in note 43) (observing that "[i]n many
[US] states, a court may order a partition in kind of part of the property and a partition
by sale of the remainder").
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FIGURE 1. HOMEACRE
I
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Ann and Burt grew up in the family home, and Casper, an
impecunious musician, has been living rent-free in the garage
apartment for the past twenty years. Ann wants to live in the
family home, but only if she can have all of Homeacre, including
the garage apartment and surrounding yard. Burt, who never
liked Homeacre, just wants his share of the money from sale.
Casper desperately wants to continue living in the garage,
which occupies a central location in a community to which he is
deeply attached and has many features that he has tailored to
his highly idiosyncratic tastes. The fair market values and the
subjective increments 46 that the co-owners attach to the areas in
Homeacre identified in Figure 1 are set out in Table 1.
46 We refer here to the difference between the party's reservation price and fair
market value. See Thomas W. Merrill and Henry E. Smith, Property 249 (Oxford 2010)
(identifying a "subjective premium"). The subjective component of an owner's valuation
is sometimes called the "consumer surplus." See James E. Krier and Christopher Serkin,
Public Ruses, 2004 Mich St L Rev 859, 866.
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TABLE 1. VALUATIONS OF HOMEACRE'S AREAS
Fair Subjective Total
Market Increment Economic
Value [Held By] Value
Portion with $150K $0 $150K
Home
(Areas 1 and 2)
Portion with $50K $105K $155K
Garage [Casper]
Apartment
(Area 3)
Whole Parcel $250K $50K $300K
(Kept Intact) [Ann]
(Areas 1, 2, and 3)
In this case, the total economic value 4l is greater when split-
ting the property into two pieces ($150K + $155K = $305K) than
when keeping it together as a whole ($300K). But it would also
be economically destructive to order partition in kind full stop,
as this would require physically splitting up the family home,
which now occupies two-thirds of the property. We can assume
that Ann and Burt, each left with a portion of a house, would
eventually coordinate to sell it, but there would be a significant
hassle factor. Partition by sale would maximize value if Casper
could be the high bidder; he could then keep the garage apart-
ment portion and sell the balance, producing the most valuable
use of the land. But Casper is illiquid, and hence not a good can-
didate to be the high bidder. Alternatively, Ann could be the
high bidder at $300K and then sell the two pieces separately,
but again, Casper will be unable to bid his valuation of $155K. A
sale will at most yield the parties a total value of $300K.
Enter partial partition. The court could let Casper keep his
portion of the land, and order partition by sale as to the balance.
As Table 2 shows, this solution maximizes the property's total
economic value. 48
47 Economic value is the total value an owner attaches to a certain thing. It com-
prises an objective part (fair market value) and an additional subjective increment. See
Chang, Private Property and Takings Compensation at 5 (cited in note 29).
48 It is worth remarking on the ambiguous distributive posture of this result. From
the perspective of fair market value, Casper appears to be getting shortchanged. He ends
up with property that has a fair market value of $50K, while Ann and Burt get property
with a fair market value of $150K, or $75K each. From another perspective, however,
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TABLE 2. PAYOFFS FOR ANN, BURT, AND CASPER UNDER
DIFFERENT PARTITION APPROACHES
Ann's payoff Burt's Casper's Total
payoff payoff
(1) Full partition in $55 $55 $155 t $265
kind ($75 less $20 ($75 less (tie)
in hassle) $20 in
hassle)
(2) Partition by sale, $83.33 $83.33 $83.33 $250
and Ann, Burt, and
Casper do not
participate in the
auction
(3) Partition by sale, $100 $100 t $100 $300
and Ann is the ($300 less
highest bidder (at $200 to pay
her reservation off others)
price)
(4) Partition by sale, $133.33 $83.33 $83.33 $300
and Ann is the ($300 less
highest bidder (at $166.66) t
FMV)
(5) Partial partition: $75 $75 $155 t $305 t
Partition in kind for (tie)
the garage portion
(area 3); partition by
sale for the home
portion (areas 1 and
2)
t marks the best partition approach for a co-tenant and in total.
Note: Gray shading indicates the party retains physical possession of all or
part of the property. Values are given in thousands.
Ann and Burt are getting shortchanged. Casper gets something worth $155K to him,
while they only get $75K each. He gets more than half of the total economic value gener-
ated by the property, whereas if the total of $305K were divided in thirds, they would
each get $101.66K. At the same time, Casper's insistence on partition in kind deprives
Ann and Burt of the chance to sell the property at a price that would exploit economies of
scale; if it were sold at fair market value of $250K, each would receive $83.33K. Ann is
also losing the chance to be the high bidder and Burt is losing the chance to share in the
surplus that Ann's high bid would generate, if the procedure were one that would elicit
Ann's reservation price. These distributive questions will resurface in Part II's discus-
sion insofar as they bear on the earlier decisions or bidding behavior of the parties.
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Significantly, a partial-partition alternative will not be pur-
sued if the court follows a rule that seeks to maximize the fair
market value of the land; fair market value is higher if the prop-
erty is kept as a unit. Moreover, if the judicial partition regime
requires or allows courts to move directly to partition by sale if
full partition in kind is infeasible, then the court would again
choose an inefficient outcome, given liquidity constraints. Add-
ing the alternative of partial partition can improve the efficiency
of judicial partition outcomes.
As this example shows, partial partition can address liquidi-
ty problems that prevent HSV co-tenants like Casper from being
the high bidder. Partial partition can also be valuable when
multiple co-tenants hold high subjective values in different por-
tions of the property. Rather than requiring them all to bid
against each other and then engage in further transactions
amongst themselves to get each section of the property back to
its highest valuer, a partial-partition procedure can simply allo-
cate the property to those who wish to remain in possession (so
long as the areas in which they hold subjective value do not
overlap) while cashing out the shares of the other co-tenants.
Carrying out a partial-partition plan requires establishing
rules for how payments will be collected from and disbursed to
the co-tenants. More fundamentally, it requires some method for
determining when partial partition is appropriate. The associat-
ed design challenges are explored in the next Part.
II. REFORM AND REVELATION
As our analysis to this point has indicated, a workable set of
partition rules must not only account for the core factors of
economies of scale and subjective valuations, but must also con-
tend with pre-partition strategic behavior and barriers to bid-
ding such as liquidity shortfalls and coordination problems. In
this Part, we examine partial-partition approaches that would
make use of information about subjective valuations elicited
from the co-tenants. Section A considers the difficulties associat-
ed with obtaining truthful information in this context. Section B
offers a concrete proposal designed to spur further dialogue.
A. Self-Assessment-Based Partition Rules
As we have seen, the efficient resolution of a partition ac-
tion may depend on private valuation information that is inac-
cessible to a court. One possibility is to use the co-tenants' own
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self-reported valuations to inform the decision. Self-assessed
valuation mechanisms have received primary attention in the
eminent domain context,49 but in some ways the partition con-
text is a more promising setting in which to apply these ideas.5o
The basic idea behind self-assessment is that the owner of a
piece of property is in the best position to know its value. The
challenge is to devise a mechanism that will induce her to reveal
it. Such a mechanism must be capable of checking both over-
statements and understatements, and this requires that two
consequences tending in opposite directions attach to any state-
ment of value that an owner submits.51
There are three types of consequences that might attach to a
co-tenant's statement of value. The first is simply whether the
co-tenant gets her way with respect to the dissolution of the co-
tenancy. If she wishes to stay on the land, does she get her wish?
Second, there is the question of what, if anything, she must pay
out to the other co-tenants. Third, there is the question of what,
if anything, she will receive from the other co-tenants. These
last two consequences together determine the positive or nega-
tive price associated with the co-tenant getting or not getting
her way in the partition proceeding. And these same conse-
quences will influence both valuation statements and the deci-
sion to seek or resist judicial partition in the first place.
To return to the private taking analogy, a co-tenant who
stays on the land or who is a winning bidder is in the role of a
taker who must compensate the others, while a co-tenant who
49 See, for example, Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky, Taking Compensa-
tion Private, 59 Stan L Rev 871, 890-905 (2007); Yun-chien Chang, Self-Assessment of
Takings Compensation: An Empirical Study, 28 J L, Econ & Org 265 (2012). See also
Saul Levmore, Self-Assessed Valuation Systems for Tort and Other Law, 68 Va L Rev
771, 789-90 (1982).
50 For a recent application of a self-assessment approach to "indivisible" property
held in common, see Kuperman, Note, 77 Brooklyn L Rev at 295-300 (cited in note 43).
Self-assessment has been used or proposed in a variety of other situations. See, for ex-
ample, Claudia M. Landeo and Kathryn E. Spier, Irreconcilable Differences: Judicial
Resolution of Business Deadlock, 81 U Chi L Rev 203 (2014) (dissolution of business enti-
ties); Richard A. Epstein, The Use and Limits of Self-Valuation Systems, 81 U Chi L Rev
109, 119-21 (2014) (general average contribution); Levmore, 68 Va L Rev 771 (cited in
note 49) (several examples, from "claiming" horse races to tort law); Lee Anne Fennell,
Revealing Options, 118 Harv L Rev 1399, 1444-81 (2005) (land use examples).
51 See, for example, Chang, 20 S Ct Econ Rev at 67-73 (cited in note 36); Epstein,
81 U Chi L Rev at 109-10 (cited in note 50). For a recent discussion of the challenges in-
volved in designing such a mechanism and the parameters that must be satisfied to in-
duce honest valuations, see Florenz Plassmann and T. Nicolaus Tideman, Marginal Cost
Pricing and Eminent Domain, 7 Found & Trends Microecon 1, 38-98 (2011).
Partition and Revelation
loses out is in the role of a takee who receives compensation
from the others. A party will want to take when she will have to
compensate less than what she will gain in kind, while a party
will hope to have her property taken if she will be compensated
beyond the level of her loss. Likewise, a party will not want to be
in the role of a taker if she will have to compensate beyond her
gain, and will not want to be a takee if she will receive less com-
pensation than she loses in kind. The valuation statement itself
can determine whether one will be a taker or a takee and what
price one will receive or pay in that role.
One approach would simply be that if the valuer gets her
preferred solution, the court will use her stated subjective value
to ensure that all parties receive equal shares from the partition
action.52 Consider again the example of Ann, Burt, and Casper.
If the parties submitted the valuations implicit in Table 1 above,
this information would reveal to the court that the optimal solu-
tion would entail breaking the property into two parts, one of
which would go to Casper and the other of which would be sold.
The total economic value (counting Casper's subjective premi-
um) of $305K would then be split three ways, $101.66K each.
Because the property that Ann and Burt will receive brings each
of them only $75K, each would be entitled to receive a payment
of $26.66K from Casper. This is no different from the distribu-
tive result that would have obtained had there been a partition
auction in which Casper was induced to pay his reservation
price for the whole property. The only difference is the revela-
tion mechanism.
A concern is that parties like Casper will understate their
valuations because the payments they must make are tied to
their bids. If they have full information about the valuations of
the other parties, they would try to state a value that is epsilon
above the next highest bid. Of course, other co-tenants might at-
tempt to push up Casper's valuation statement (since it deter-
mines what they will receive from Casper) by threatening to
place overstated bids of their own. As Casper attempts to avoid
stating his full subjective value and as his co-tenants attempt to
force him to do so, understatements and overstatements may
place the property in the hands of the wrong party.
52 This approach equates to a first-price auction. For a general introduction to and
comparison of types of auctions, see Yaad Rotem and Omer Dekel, The Bankruptcy Auc-
tion as a Game-Designing an Optimal Auction in Bankruptcy, 32 Rev Litig 323, 358-73
(2013).
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Yet even if this alternative did a reasonably good job of
checking overstatements and understatements, the fact that the
amount of one party's subjective valuation determines the pay-
outs to other co-tenants could be problematic from an ex ante
perspective. It could lead other co-tenants to strategically seek
judicial partition simply to receive transfers of subjective premia
from other co-tenants. A procedure that instead ties payouts by
a winning co-tenant to another metric, such as the amount that
the other co-tenants lose when the court adopts her solution over
another, could help to address this issue, although it would do so
imperfectly.
For example, a court might require a party like Casper who
wins partial partition in kind as a result of his valuation to com-
pensate the other parties for any difference between the value of
the shares of the sales proceeds they will realize from the bal-
ance of the property, and the shares they would have received
had the entire property been sold as a consolidated unit. This, of
course, raises the question of what auction or sales mechanism
would have been employed to sell the unit as a whole. Depend-
ing on the procedure used, the sales price could be anywhere
from Ann's full reservation price to something less than fair
market value. Regardless of the metric chosen, Casper's pay-
ments to the others would not be benchmarked to his own valua-
tion statement, but rather to someone else's valuation of the en-
tire parcel that is elicited through an auction or other revelation
procedure.
Will such an approach induce more honest valuations? Cas-
per may be wary of overstating his subjective surplus when it
could produce a result-partition in kind plus a duty to compen-
sate-that he likes less than simply getting a share of the pro-
ceeds from selling the parcel as a whole. If he is sure he will be
better off with partition in kind (after compensating the others),
he might well overstate his valuation to be assured of winning
partition in kind-and this mechanism would allow him to do so
with impunity.53 But his overstatement would not produce ineffi-
ciency relative to partition by sale; by hypothesis, Casper is the
53 Because there is no penalty tied to the magnitude of his statement once it is over
the threshold that wins partition in kind and triggers his compensation obligation, he
would not be further constrained from making an overstatement.
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highest valuer.54 While it is always possible for Casper to miscal-
culate and overbid in error, he is less likely to make this mistake
when there are clear reasons to doubt that his preferred solution
is the efficient approach-as where there is a large economy of
scale associated with keeping the property whole.
55
Casper also has no obvious incentive to understate his sub-
jective surplus because the amount he has to compensate the
others does not depend on how high or low his valuation is, but
rather on how high or low the hypothetical sales price would be
for the whole property. Of course, the same liquidity problem
mentioned above might recur here, causing Casper to simply ac-
cept partition by sale rather than submit any valuation state-
ment at all. But this problem is significantly buffered in this
context, and presumably easier to solve. Instead of having to go
to an auction and bid the full amount of his subjective value
(which is far above the property's market value), he need only
come up with a fraction of that amount to pay the others.56
So far we have been vague about how the payouts from Cas-
per to the other parties would be calculated under this alterna-
tive. How we resolve this question will introduce new concerns,
including the possibility of strategic bidding by Casper's co-
tenants. Suppose Casper's payouts were keyed to Ann's valua-
tion of $300K. If Casper were required to bring everyone to the
level they would have occupied had Ann bid this amount and
distributed the proceeds equally, then he would have to pay both
Ann and Burt $25K each. 57 Because this result compensates
Burt beyond the baseline of FMV, it might cause Burt to seek
judicial partition and resist a voluntary solution.
54 As our regime does not seek to use self-assessed value in the future (such as in
levying property taxes), it does not matter that the highest valuer exaggerates his or her
true value.
55 This is because he would run the greatest risk in such situations of getting his
way and then having to (over)compensate the others. Depending on how his compensa-
tion to the others will be determined, he might also be deterred from overstating his val-
ue if he knew another co-tenant, such as Ann in our example, also held significant sub-
jective value in the property, or if he feared strategic bidding by one or more of his co-
tenants. See text accompanying notes 57-58.
56 If Casper cannot access equity in the property immediately, an alternative would
be to place a lien on the property. See Ariel Porat, Private Production of Public Goods:
Liability for Unrequested Benefits, 108 Mich L Rev 189, 212 (2009) (explaining how a lien
could address liquidity issues in an expanded restitution context).
57 Areas 1 and 2 are expected to sell for $150K, which will give Ann and Burt $75K
each. An additional $25K would bring each to the $100K level that would result from an
even split of Ann's bid of $300K.
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Perhaps more worrisome is the fact that it might cause Ann
or Burt to strategically overstate their valuations to increase the
share they will receive from Casper.5s They run a risk in increas-
ing their bids if they are uncertain about Casper's true subjec-
tive valuation, since they might accidentally outbid him and
then have to compensate the others. If Casper fears their over-
bids will dispossess him of the property, he might overstate his
own bid, though again, he does so at the risk of ending up hav-
ing to compensate for a second bid that is above his own true
reservation price. The full dynamic must be left to formal model-
ing and empirical testing, but the risk exists that the parties'
strategic behavior will produce inefficient results.
Another option would merely require the winner to compen-
sate his co-tenants for their share of the whole property's FMV.
This approach has the advantage of controlling gaming by the
FV co-tenants who would otherwise try to increase their com-
pensation. The disadvantage is that there would be no check on
overstatements by HSV co-tenants like Casper and Ann. They
would each put in infinite bids in an effort to outbid the other,
knowing that they would only be obligated to compensate the
other co-tenants at FMV.
A final set of possibilities would break the link between the
amount that Casper must pay and the amount that his co-
tenants receive.59 For example, suppose Casper had to pay an
58 The procedure described in the text equates to a second-price or "Vickrey" auc-
tion. As Professor William Vickrey himself recognized, collusive bids by sellers designed
to "jack the price up" can undermine the procedure's truth-revealing properties. William
Vickrey, Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders, 16 J Fin 8, 22
(1961) (noting this problem and suggesting countermeasures). Co-tenants who expect to
lose the auction and receive the proceeds of the second bid are effectively in the position
of a seller-yet unlike ordinary sellers, they are entitled to bid on the property.
59 Delinking of this sort has featured in some past auction proposals. See, for ex-
ample, Clark Wiseman, Rezoning by Auction-A New Approach to Land Use Decisions,
35 Utah Sci 86, 87-88 (1974) (describing an auction procedure in which those who win a
rezoning must pay their own valuations but those who lose receive only their own valua-
tions); T. Nicolaus Tideman and Gordon Tullock, A New and Superior Process for Making
Social Choices, 84 J Polit Econ 1145, 1148 (1976) (explaining how under a Clarke-Groves
voting mechanism "[a]ny money collected from voters ... must be wasted or given to
nonvoters to keep the incentives correct"). The problem remains of what shall be done
with the excess money that Casper must pay but that his co-tenants will not receive
back. Because the money is collected in a judicial partition procedure, it would be feasi-
ble to simply establish a fund related to the administrative costs of adjudicating co-
ownership disputes into which excess monies could be deposited. See Wiseman, 35 Utah
Sci at 88 (cited in note 59) (suggesting that differences between auction payments in and
out, net of administrative costs, "be treated as general tax revenue"); Tideman and
Tullock, 84 J Polit Econ at 1154 n 2 (cited in note 59) ("One possibility for avoiding waste
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amount that would be sufficient to give his co-tenants their
shares of the total economic value of the property ($305K, on the
numbers above), but that his co-tenants actually received only
their share of the property's FMV. This approach would limit
overbidding while avoiding gaming by FMV co-tenants (includ-
ing in the initial decision to seek judicial partition). It would
likely produce underbidding (like any other first-price auction),
but at least there would not be a concern about FMV co-tenants
attempting to force up the bid. The downside of this approach is
that other HSV co-tenants like Ann would receive payouts that
are significantly less than their subjective valuations. This pro-
spect could open the door to ex ante strategizing or could lead to
overbidding behaviors to avoid bearing a loss.
A variation on this theme, which we will use as the basis for
our proposal below, would allow co-tenants who elect partial
partition in kind to recover their shares of their own synthesized
bids, while limiting co-tenants who opted for a partition sale to
their share of FMV. Additional design features might be added
to control inflated partial-partition bids by FMV co-tenants.
60
As this brief survey has suggested, it does not seem possible
to design a fully incentive-compatible mechanism given the con-
straints we have specified and the goals we are pursuing. Which
of the options canvassed above will perform best is an empirical
question and one that could benefit from formal modeling. We
will close with a brief summary of how such a procedure might
be operationalized under the last alternative discussed above,
recognizing that a different set of rules for payments and pay-
outs might ultimately prove superior.
B. A Possible Approach
To fix ideas and to provide a springboard for further empiri-
cal and theoretical work, we offer the following three-step pro-
posal for a new judicial partition protocol.61 It will not produce
[in a Clarke-Groves voting mechanism] would be for pairs of communities to agree to ex-
change their collections of these excess revenues."); Abraham Bell and Gideon Par-
chomovsky, Governing Communities by Auction, 81 U Chi L Rev 1, 24-25 (2014) (dis-
cussing possible uses of excess funds generated by their auction mechanism, including
sharing arrangements among communities).
60 See text accompanying notes 63-64.
61 Our proposal most resembles a first-price, sealed-bid auction. See Rotem and
Dekel, 32 Rev Litig at 358-73 (cited in note 52). Note, however, that the co-tenant con-
text differs from that of ordinary auctions in one important respect: co-tenants who place
bids may wind up as either buyers or sellers (that is, takers or takees), while in ordinary
20141
48 The University of Chicago Law Review [81:27
first-best results, but we think it could represent an improve-
ment over the status quo.
1. Step one: electing a partition method.
A co-owner seeking judicial partition would first be required
to state his or her preference for one of two alternatives: full
partition of the property by sale, or partial partition in kind. A
co-owner who seeks full partition of the property by sale would
be requesting the liquidation of the property at FMV. A co-
owner who wished to remain on the land could petition for par-
tial partition in kind.62 To invoke this procedure, a co-owner
might have to meet additional criteria, such as demonstrating a
connection to the property, satisfying a holding period,63 or post-
ing a bond that will be forfeited if she wins the right to remain
on the property but sells within a particular time frame.64
2. Step two: valuation.
The court would ask each party petitioning for partial parti-
tion in kind to submit the following: (1) a diagram of the proper-
ty with any area in which the individual holds subjective value
clearly marked, (2) a statement of the total value that the indi-
vidual places on the marked area, and (3) an independent ap-
praisal of the balance of the property. Following the values given
in Table 1 above, Ann would submit a diagram with the entire
property marked and a value of $300K indicated. Casper would
submit a diagram with the garage apartment area (area 3)
auctions, bidders occupy only the role of potential buyers (absent collusion with sellers to
submit fake bids).
62 Although partial-partition procedures fit most naturally with multiparty scenar-
ios like the one elaborated in the text, co-tenants in two-party scenarios would also get
the same choices: partial partition in kind or full partition by sale. Even when only two
parties are involved, one party's share can still be liquidated through sale while the oth-
er is awarded in kind. Similarly, one co-tenant could request to retain in-kind possession
of an unequal share of the property or even the entire property (as in the case of Ann,
above, who had subjective value in the full tract).
63 For an example of a similar restriction employed in Arkansas, see Kuperman,
Note, 77 Brooklyn L Rev at 288 (cited in note 43), citing Ark Code Ann § 18-60-404 (re-
quiring a three-year waiting period before a co-tenant who purchases a minority interest
as "a stranger to the title"-defined as not being related to any of the others within four
degrees of consanguinity-can petition for partition).
64 For a similar inalienability approach to preventing false self-assessments in the
eminent domain context, see Bell and Parchomovksy, 59 Stan L Rev at 892-95 (cited in
note 49).
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marked and a value of $155K indicated, and would also submit
an appraisal for the balance of the property (areas 1 and 2).
When multiple HSV co-tenants have attachments to
nonoverlapping pieces of the property, they may elect to file a
combined submission with the court, or they may file separate
submissions. Any party filing a separate submission should in-
dicate to the court whether she wishes to have her submission
combined with those of the other co-tenants seeking partial par-
tition, where it is possible to do so.
65
If the submissions reflect conflicting plans for partitioning
the property, the court will order an auction at which bids will
be automatically placed on behalf of the co-tenants seeking par-
tial partition in kind. Each such bid would be constructed from
the reservation price stated for the portion of the property that
the co-tenant wishes to retain plus the fair market value of the
balance of the property. To return to our earlier example, a bid
of $305K would be submitted on behalf of Casper ($155K valua-
tion of area 3, plus $150K FMV of areas 1 and 2), and a bid of
$300K would be submitted on behalf of Ann (reflecting her sub-
jective valuation of the whole property).
3. Step three: deciding and settling up.
In our example, Casper would win the bid. He would get to
keep area 3, and areas 1 and 2 would be sold for their FV
($150K). Casper would be required to make a payment into a
fund that would be sufficient to give his co-tenants their shares
of the full economic value revealed by his bid. Casper would thus
have to pay $53.33K, the difference between Ann and Burt's col-
lective $203.33K share of $305K and the FV sales price of
$150K for areas 1 and 2.
Ann and Burt do not actually receive this full amount, how-
ever. Instead, Ann (as a co-tenant who also elected partial parti-
tion in kind) would receive enough to make up one-third of her
$300K bid (here, $25K) 6 and Burt (who did not elect partial par-
tition in kind) would receive enough to make up his share of the
65 Space does not permit tracing all the wrinkles associated with these "bundling"
alternatives. The basic intuition is that a group of HSV co-tenants might have a com-
bined valuation that exceeds the FMV of the entire parcel, even though no single HSV
co-tenant would have a high enough valuation on her own.
66 This amount is calculated by subtracting her share from the sale of areas 1 and 2
($75K) from her share of her own bid ($100K).
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$250K in FMV (here, $8.33K).67 The balance of the funds paid by
Casper (that is, the portion that was not disbursed to Ann and
Burt; here, $20K)68 goes into a fund earmarked for co-tenant
mediation efforts or for administering the system.69
This three-step approach does not address all difficulties.
There is still room for parties to strategize, and concerns with
understatements and overstatements will remain. Nonetheless,
we think a procedure of this sort may offer a significant im-
provement over the binary choice between partition in kind and
partition by sale. Whether or not our readers agree, we hope our
proposal spurs further discussion about the best way to address
partition problems. More broadly, we hope that our dissection of
the co-tenancy problem offers insights for the use of self-
assessment techniques in other contexts.
CONCLUSION
Analysis of co-ownership partition needs to go beyond an ex
post comparison of partition in kind and partition by sale. While
we agree that scale economies and subjective value are the
foremost concerns in determining the most efficient partition
approach in a given dispute, this Article contributes to the liter-
ature by examining when and how we might employ revelation
mechanisms that harness otherwise hard-to-verify subjective
values. We show how such approaches might be integrated into
67 This amount is calculated by subtracting his share from the sale of areas 1 and 2
($75K) from his share of the property's FMV ($83.33K).
68 $20K = $53.33K - $25K - $8.33K. For co-tenants, the $20K that goes to the fund
is money left on the table. If they have good information as to how much each other
would bid, they may reach an agreement of voluntary partition. Facilitating ex ante bar-
gaining is an advantage of our proposal. Note that because voluntary partition has to be
consensual, no co-tenant would agree to a deal that makes him worse off. That is, the
$20K would only make all or some of the co-tenants better off in voluntary agreements,
as compared to judicial partition. Court costs also represent savings that parties could
realize through a voluntary arrangement. See Baucells and Lippman, 22 Cardozo L Rev
at 1207-09 (cited in note 6) (modeling the effect of legal costs on bargaining dynamics).
69 Our analysis here assumes that the property, or relevant pieces of it, will actual-
ly sell at FMV. As we point out in Appendix B, the property is likely to be sold below
FMV at court auctions. Addressing the risk of below-FMV bids requires additional de-
sign features that space does not permit us to fully elaborate here, but the general ap-
proach would entail providing opportunities for co-tenants to bid on the relevant portions
of the property so that a negotiated sale can be conducted at a later date. The fund could
also be used to fill in the gap if the sale price of the sold portion falls below the appraised
value.
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intermediate partition approaches, such as partial partition,
which are prevalent in practice but currently undertheorized.
Moreover, our analysis looks not only at the partition event in
isolation, but also at the way in which partition rules influence
earlier decisions. More empirical and theoretical work on the in-
stitution of co-ownership is needed to test the strategies that
this Article has discussed or proposed, but we hope to have indi-
cated here some directions such work might take.

